Global Competition Policy and Market Dynamics: Convergence, Divergence, and the Political Economy of Enforcement in a Digitalized World

Abstract

Global competition policy has become a central determinant of market dynamics as cross-border trade, phantomization, and data-driven business models reshape competitive interactions. While most jurisdictions share core antitrust goals—preventing cartels, addressing unilateral conduct, and reviewing mergers—global convergence has plateaued due to divergent legal standards, political priorities, and institutional capacities. This article develops an integrated framework linking (i) policy design (substantive standards, procedural tools, remedies), (ii) enforcement institutions (independence, resources, cooperation), and (iii) market structure evolution (concentration, entry/exit, innovation, markups). We synthesize evidence on declining market dynamism and rising concentration concerns, and we analyse how digital regulation and ex ante rules complement (and sometimes complicate) traditional competition enforcement. The article proposes measurable indicators and a policy “toolbox” for aligning global competition governance with dynamic efficiency: contestability, innovation, and resilience. A multi-level set of recommendations is offered for developed and developing economies, emphasizing cooperation through networks and soft-law instruments, improved merger scrutiny for killer acquisitions, and remedy design tailored to data and platform ecosystems.